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The Role of Lawyers in Removing
Economic Activity from State
Supervision
W. Mark C. Weidemaier ∗

I. INTRODUCTION
Economic activity does not always depend on state-created law (to set the
rules), state-funded courts (to resolve disputes), or state coercion (to enforce compliance). These well-known facts have motivated a large and inter-disciplinary literature spanning law, economics, history, sociology, anthropology, and other disciplines. 1 To take a famous example, Robert Ellickson documented how ranchers in
Shasta County in Northern California observed behavioral norms that differed from
the law’s requirements and enforced these norms not through legal coercion but
through gossip and other social mechanisms. 2
This short essay is prompted by Steven Ware’s Private Ordering and Commercial Arbitration, which appears elsewhere in this volume. 3 Ware’s article is a
thoughtful and persuasive reflection on the importance of Soia Mentschikoff to the
voluminous literature on private ordering, as well as a call to recognize the importance of arbitration as a tool of self-governance. I largely agree with him on these
points. I do, however, want to use Ware’s discussion as a point of departure, highlighting an important question that he seems to overlook—as, indeed, does most of
the private ordering literature.
For the most part, that literature asks two questions. First, why do some communities reject state-created law and legal institutions for “tailored law and a separate system of governance”? 4 Second, how do such communities solve the “problem of enforcing agreements in exchange”? 5 In other words, what are the mechanisms by which self-governing communities lend certainty to transactions among
members? These questions are important, but they do not make a complete set. A
community that aspires to self-governance must do more than facilitate trade. In
Ralph M. Stockton, Jr. Distinguished Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law. Thanks
to Melissa Jacoby and Steven Ware for helpful comments on prior drafts.
1. For a recent summary, see BARAK D. RICHMAN, STATELESS COMMERCE: THE DIAMOND
NETWORK AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RELATIONAL EXCHANGE (2017).
2. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991).
3. Stephen J. Ware, Private Ordering and Commercial Arbitration: Lasting Lessons from
Mentschikoff, J. DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming 2018).
4. Richman, supra note 1. Answers tend to focus on the efficiency gains from private adjudication,
see Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 126 (1992) (noting that one benefit of arbitration is that some disputes
“are common enough that they are dealt with consistently according to widely known customs” that
differ from ordinary rules of contract law); Ware, supra note 3 at 14 (noting that arbitration may help
facilitate cross-border transactions by facilitating award enforcement), or the efficiency gains from private enforcement, see Barak D. Richman, Norms and Law: Putting the Horse Before the Cart, 62 DUKE
L.J. 739, 762-66 (2012) (emphasizing the importance of enforcement efficiencies).
5. See, e.g. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual Commitments,
HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 175 (Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley, eds. 2008).
∗

20

JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 2019

many cases, it will also have to navigate a constantly-shifting relationship with the
state itself. There may be overlap, but the tools required for this task may be very
different from the tools that facilitate and enforce transactions. Yet this question—
How do self-governing communities create and maintain independence from state
law and institutions?—has not attracted much attention.
The discussion to follow begins by using Professor Ware’s thoughtful article
to highlight how easy it is to overlook this important question. My primary contribution, however, is a case study of my own, which I will keep very brief due to
space constraints. That case study draws on archival research into the operation of
the London Stock Exchange (LSE), arguably the most important institution in the
capitalist world during the 19th and much of the 20th centuries. 6 The LSE’s relationship with the state was anything but frictionless, and much of the LSE’s internal
work was devoted to ensuring that state legal actors maintained an appropriate distance. As we will see, this work was often explicitly legal, and lawyers played important roles. Observing their work reveals how the law and legal institutions—
including the norms such institutions foster in lawyers—can subtly support and constrain private ordering activities.

II. FROM MENTSCHIKOFF TO THE PRESENT: GAPS IN THE PRIVATE
ORDERING LITERATURE
Judged by metrics like citation count or the esteem of scholars of arbitration
and commercial law, Soia Mentschikoff’s Commercial Arbitration is one of the
most influential pieces of scholarship in the arbitration canon. 7 A deeply realist exploration of commercial arbitration practice among trade association members and
before the American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration is, among
many other things, an early model for the empirical study of alternative dispute
resolution processes. Mentschikoff rejected broad generalizations, such as the
“folklore” 8 view of arbitration as an ad hoc process in which the rules and norms of
trial practice simply do not matter. 9 Instead, she emphasized that “the structure and
the process of commercial arbitration are determined by the different institutional
contexts in which it arises.” 10 And she demonstrated the importance of institutional
context empirically, revealing important differences between trade association arbitration and commercial arbitration conducted under the auspices of the American
Arbitration Association (AAA).
For Ware, Mentschikoff’s study of trade association arbitration is noteworthy
for raising “fundamental questions about the roles of private parties in the production, application, and enforcement of law.” 11 He has long been interested in such

6. Larry Neal and Lance Davis, The Evolution of the Structure and Performance of the London Stock
Exchange in the First Global Financial Market, 1812-1914, 10 EUR. REV. OF HIST. 279, 279-80 (2006).
7. Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1961).
8. Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration With a Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L.
REV. 39, 42 (1999).
9. Soia Mentschikoff, The Significance of Commercial Arbitration, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
698, 706 (1952). For instance, she dismissed as “patent nonsense” the claim that rules of evidence and
procedure do not influence arbitration practice.
10. Mentschikoff, supra note 7 at 848.
11. Ware, supra note 3 at 18.
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questions, and in arbitration in particular, emphasizing problematic as well as beneficial consequences of taking dispute resolution private. 12 Like Mentschikoff,
Ware is especially interested in trade associations and other self-governing merchant communities. The study of such communities is integral to the broader literature on private ordering, and Ware rightly emphasizes Mentschikoff’s importance
to this literature. It is worth pointing out that Ware proves one can write about
Mentschikoff’s work without mentioning that she was once married to another
prominent law professor. 13
I have little to add to Ware’s assessment of Mentschikoff’s importance and few
complaints with his call to recognize the importance of arbitration as a tool of private ordering. I do, however, want to probe an assumption he makes about the
state’s relationship to trade associations and similar communities. Ware situates
such groups along what we might call the “government support” continuum. At one
pole, we find examples in which state actors actively support private ordering. For
example, in some settings, trading partners may have little reason to fear that breach
or other malfeasance will harm their reputation or have other adverse, extralegal
consequences. If they submit disputes to arbitration, the winner will need state actors to help enforce the award; states devote significant resources to making this
possible. 14 At the opposite pole, we find private ordering against a backdrop of
vigorous state opposition. Ware cites the Mafia and other criminal organizations as
examples. 15 In his view, trade associations like those studied by Mentschikoff fall
into a middle zone of state neutrality, receiving “neither significant government
support nor significant government opposition.” 16
This continuum is analytically useful, for it reminds us of Mentschikoff’s admonition that context matters. 17 If private ordering requires varying amounts of
state support and encounters varying amounts of state opposition, then the process
of arbitration should reflect these relationships. For example, we might expect
stricter confidentiality requirements to accompany arbitration when conducted
against a backdrop of state opposition. But I am not sure I accept Ware’s assumption
that trade associations occupy a position of neutrality with regard to the state. More
fundamentally, I would caution against assuming that such groups enjoy a static,
relatively frictionless relationship to the state, such that private ordering activities
take place against a stable backdrop of government support or opposition. This may
occasionally be true, but it will often be false. For instance, state actors may become
intensely interested in regulating transactions they previously viewed with indifference.

12. For example, he has emphasized that, because of limited judicial review, arbitration has the potential to convert civil rights and other ostensibly mandatory laws into default rules. See Stephen J. Ware,
Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703
(1999).
13. A search for Soia /s Mentschikoff in Westlaw’s Law Reviews and Journals database produces 384
hits. Of these, nearly one-third (123) refer to the other law professor by name within the same paragraph.
Only a few of these references seem necessary—for instance, to accurately describe aspects of the Uniform Commercial Code’s drafting history. By contrast, when an article refers to the other professor,
Mentschikoff’s name appears within the same paragraph only two percent of the time.
14. Ware, supra note 3 at 7-8.
15. Ware, supra note 3 at 6-7.
16. Id. at 7.
17. Mentschikoff, supra note 7 at 848.
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By keeping in mind that the attitudes of state actors often shift over time, we
can see a host of questions that, as I have noted, the private ordering literature
mostly overlooks. These are not the usual questions about how private actors use
private institutions to create and enforce their preferred rules of exchange. Instead,
they are questions about how communities that aspire to self-governance keep the
state at bay. 18 This latter set of questions is important, for the answers reveal that
the law and lawyers can support and constrain extralegal institutions in subtle but
important ways.

III. THE LSE AND THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN CREATING SPACE FOR SELFGOVERNANCE
Let me give two examples drawn from materials in the LSE archives at the
London Metropolitan Archives and Guildhall Library. 19 Though never fully independent of the state, the LSE was largely self-regulating, 20 and its rules allowed
transactions, such as time bargains and options, that courts would not reliably enforce. 21 To protect such transactions, and to ensure the consistent application of its
rules, the LSE resolved many disputes internally (via committee vote), and it also
required members to arbitrate disputes arising out of exchange transactions. In addition to these rules governing dispute resolution, other LSE rules limited the risk
that state actors would scrutinize exchange practices. For example, exchange members originally could not be incorporated bodies and could form partnerships only
with other members. 22 The LSE took violations of these rules seriously, frequently
by suspending or expelling members. 23
18. Even the literature on criminal organizations, which cannot overlook the fact of state opposition,
tends to overlook such questions. In their study of the Japanese organized crime, for instance, Milhaupt
and West focus on how organized crime fills in for an inefficient, state-sponsored system of rights enforcement. Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An Institutional and
Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41 (2000).
19. Most materials are found at reference code CLC/B/004. References beginning with MS14600 are
to CfGP meeting minutes, followed by the volume or file number, the page number (where available),
and the date. References beginning with MS14612 are to the minutes of the Sub-committee on Rules
and Regulations.
20. Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United
Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 482 (2001).
21. E. VICTOR MORGAN & W.A. THOMAS, THE STOCK EXCHANGE: ITS HISTORY AND FUNCTIONS 63
(2d ed. 1969). As one 19th century treatise on the LSE put it: “These remarks as to the voidability of
[options] contracts … do not, of course, apply to bargains made between members of the Stock Exchange, for they are bound by their rules … to refer their disputes to a tribunal which does not afford to
persons dissatisfied with their contracts such facilities for repudiating them.” RUDOLPH E. MELSHEIMER
& WALTER LAURENCE, THE LAW AND CUSTOMS OF THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE 25 (1879). Note
the whiff of disdain with which the authors—a prominent lawyer and member of the LSE—refer to the
public courts. See also William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13-15 (2013) (discussing the similar early history of the New York Stock Exchange).
22. RANALD C. MICHIE, THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE: A HISTORY 97-98 (1999). These rules limited the capital available to members but also reduced the likelihood of disputes involving non-members,
who could not easily be prevented from bringing disputes to the courts.
23. It may be analytically helpful to distinguish private ordering regimes that rely on private enforcement from those that rely on courts and other public actors. See Richman, supra note 4 at 762-66. But
the distinction can be artificial, as entities need not fall neatly into one camp or the other. The LSE
viewed public enforcement as a risk to its autonomy and preferred to keep members in line through
private enforcement mechanisms. But it also closely monitored legal developments and worked to make
sure that courts would honor its rules and customs in the event private enforcement failed.
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The LSE’s place on what I have called the government support continuum was
anything but fixed. To the contrary, public attitudes towards the exchange and its
members shifted widely over time, as one might expect of an institution associated
with recurring financial crises: “Whenever stock prices endured a period of sustained decline, Parliament would again consider legislation designed to limit the
perceived excesses of stockjobbers.” 24 Because of these constant state intrusions,
much of the LSE’s internal work involved questions about how to best maintain
independence. Lawyers played a key role in this work.
In one illustrative episode, the Committee for General Purposes (CfGP), which
was responsible for the LSE’s overall management, learned of a lawsuit against an
exchange member named Dunbar, brought by a non-member ostensibly employed
as Dunbar’s clerk. 25 Dunbar had promised the clerk “a salary at a rate equal to half
the net profits of the business,” 26 and the CfGP quite reasonably viewed this arrangement as a forbidden partnership with a non-member. Hauled before the Committee, Dunbar defended himself, in part, by claiming to have acted on a solicitor’s
advice that the arrangement did not constitute a partnership. 27 However plausible
the defense, Dunbar escaped serious penalty, as a resolution declaring that he had
“incurred the severe censure of the Committee” failed by a 10:10 vote. 28
Apparently concerned by this precedent—and by the risk that disputes arising
out of profit-sharing agreements with non-members would invite public scrutiny—
the CfGP asked the Sub-Committee on Rules and Regulations to look into revising
LSE rules to forbid similar arrangements. The Sub-Committee’s meeting minutes
reflect that this process involved extensive consultation with lawyers, who ultimately recommended amending the rules both to explicitly forbid profit sharing
arrangements and to give the LSE itself final authority over what constituted a forbidden arrangement. Thus, the solicitors advised adding language to the rules to
clarify that the CfGP’s decisions about “what constitutes Partnership within the
meaning and intention of the Rules shall be final.” 29 This change to LSE rules effectively closed a loophole that had given courts an opportunity to review the business dealings of LSE members and to opine on the range of business relationships
that could comply with exchange rules.
In another episode, a member filed a lawsuit against his late partner to resolve
a dispute concerning partnership liabilities. The lawsuit violated the spirit if not the
letter of the LSE’s rules, which required members to arbitrate disputes and forbade
them to “attempt to enforce by law against another member a claim arising out of a
Stock Exchange transaction.” Although a sub-committee had recommended suspending the member for violating this rule, the CfGP was concerned that courts
might review and reverse such a decision. The problem was that the dispute arguably did not arise out of a “Stock Exchange transaction.” At the CfGP’s request, the
LSE’s solicitors reviewed the sub-committee’s recommendation and recommended
against suspension, opining that “there is nothing in the Rules to compel the parties
24. STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL AND POLITICAL
ROOTS, 1690-1860 88 (1998). Jobbers were simply dealers who traded for their own account, although
the term had long been used pejoratively. See, e.g., MORGAN & THOMAS, supra note 21 at 21-23.
25. MS14600/92/29 (Mar. 3, 1913).
26. MS 14600/92/101 (Mar. 31, 1913).
27. MS 14600/92/101-102 (Mar. 31, 1913).
28. Id.
29. MS 14600/92/195-196 (May 19, 1913); MS14600/92/222 (June 9, 1913).
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to submit their partnership differences to the decision of the Committee.” 30 Once
again, the episode prompted amendments to the rules to ensure that future partnership disputes were subject to the arbitration requirement. And again, lawyers played
a central role. 31
The LSE archives are replete with such episodes, in which lawyers play key
roles in creating space for self-governance. In performing these roles, lawyers rely
on fundamentally legal techniques: reasoning by analogy to cases, modeling procedural recommendations on public court procedures, opining on whether non-members could be forced to arbitrate grievances against members, 32 advising how to
ensure that judges deferred to exchange practices etc. Observing their integral role
in maximizing the LSE’s independence from the state, it becomes clear that state
legal institutions—and the norms they foster in lawyers—can subtly support and
constrain private ordering activities.

IV. CONCLUSION
For lawyers and legal scholars, self-governing communities may seem to represent a fundamental “rejection of their trade.” 33 Perhaps this explains why the legal
literature, in particular, is most concerned with why some members of society opt
out of state-sponsored law and institutions and how these members structure private
institutions to facilitate trust and cooperation. These are important questions, but
we should not let them obscure the fact that self-governing communities rarely enjoy frictionless relationships with the state. To the contrary, they must create and
maintain space for self-governance, deploying legal and non-legal tools to keep
state actors at an appropriate distance. The LSE illustrates the important role that
law and lawyers can play in this process.

30.
31.
32.
33.

MS14612/3/86-88 (Jan. 27, 1916).
MS14612/3/86-103.
MS14612/1 (July 4, 1871).
Richman, supra note 1.

